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Abtract 
Nowadays, the main humanitarian organizations in charge of refugees, notably the 
UNHCR, are part of a large return movement helping refugees and displaced persons to go 
back to their prewar homes, whether in Africa, Afghanistan or the Balkans. Great difficulties 
are encountered in the return of minority groups, ranging from basic material problems to 
conflicts with a sometimes hostile majority. Whereas most (international) actors of this return 
process and many returnees tend to see it as a fulfillment of what is right and just and a 
peaceful erasing of ethnic cleansing, there are also many refugees and returnees who are quite 
reluctant to go back to a place where they would belong to a minority, preferring to settle 
elsewhere while benefiting from a right to asylum or resettlement. The issue of return 
intertwines many conflicting viewpoints and heterogeneous factors (economic, temporal, etc.) 
and is loaded with political implications. Beyond this obvious “politicization,” however, what 
are the theoretical grounds that we could bring to bear to clarify this conflict of judgments 
about the right to and rightness of return? Do the divergent points of view on the issue reflect 
conflicting conceptions of identity: international humanitarian organizations being, as some 
argue, implicitly dependant on a substantialist view of identity tied to origin, whereas refugees 
have ended up constructing a more “narrative” form of identity, including the dimensions of 
time, change and exile?  Should a return or resettlement right be granted on the basis of free 
choice and individual rights (property, for instance) or according to a right to live with the 
majority? Is there such a thing as a specific right to return? Or, instead of being derived from 
a global theory of identity, should such a right rather be analyzed as being made up of more 
basic and common rights as the right to property, to security, to freedom of movement, etc.? 
In that case, would the issue of the rightness of return simply come down to conditions of 
justice and a bundle of rights that may or may not obtain? 
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Nowadays, the main humanitarian organizations in charge of refugees, notably the 
UNHCR, are part of a large return movement helping refugees and internally displaced 
persons (DP) to go back to their prewar countries or prewar homes, whether in Africa, 
Afghanistan or the Balkans. Even though return to one's country has long been considered by 
international humanitarian organizations as a preferable and durable solution to the refugee 
problem, this push for return has become a priority in the last ten years : the UNHCR 
announced in 1992 the first year of a decade of return. In this general return process, great 
difficulties are encountered in the return of minority groups, ranging from basic material 
problems to conflicts with a sometimes hostile majority. Whereas most (international) actors 
involved in this return process and many returnees tend to see it as a fulfillment of what is 
right and a peaceful erasing of the process of persecution that had led to exile, there are also 
many refugees and returnees who are quite reluctant to go back to a place where they would 
belong to a minority, preferring instead to settle elsewhere while benefiting from a right to 
asylum or relocation. The issue of return is a thorny one, since it intertwines many conflicting 
viewpoints and heterogeneous factors (economic, temporal, etc.) and is loaded with political 
implications, on both the national and international levels.  
Beyond this obvious “politicization”, however, what are the theoretical grounds that 
we could bring to bear to clarify this conflict of judgments about the right to and rightness of 
return? Do the divergent points of view on the issue reflect conflicting views of identity, 
international humanitarian organizations being, as some argue, implicitly dependant on a 
substantialist view of identity tied to origin, whereas refugees have ended up constructing a 
more “narrative” form of identity, including the dimensions of time, change and exile?  
Should a return or resettlement right be granted on the basis of free choice and individual 
rights (property, for instance) or according to a right to live with the majority? Is there such a 
thing as a specific right to return? And, instead of being derived from a global theory of 
identity, should such a right rather be broken down into more basic and common rights such 
as the right to property, to security, to freedom of movement, etc.? In that case, would the 
issue of the rightness of return simply come down to conditions of justice and a bundle of 
rights that may or may not obtain? After underlining the inadequacy of an approach to the 
issue in terms of identity, whether it is tied to origin or changing with time, I will point to the 
importance but also the limitations of an approach in terms of rights.  
One of the difficulties involved in this issue, is the obvious political misuse of any 
concept, like that of minority rights, about which Will Kymlicka rightly argues that its use in 
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Nazi propaganda for expansionist views discredited it for a long while.1 Likewise, concerning 
the right of return, and more specifically that of minorities, a humanist rhetoric, pleading for 
the refugee's best interests, might hide political agendas that use refugees as pawns according 
to the usefulness of their return, relocation or staying in place.  
The second major difficulty is the risk of hasty generalization: first, in ignoring the 
diversity of situations and considering that one case is paradigmatic, like that of Palestinian 
return, which retains international attention when, in fact, the specificity of the difficulties 
involved there might actually be a hindrance to grasping other situations; second, in 
generalizing, not only from one situation to others, but also from a situation to certain 
concepts giving meaning to the return process, yet not taking into account the material 
conditions of their application. Such, it seems to me, is an interpretation of the relevance of 
return in terms of identity, whether collective or individual.   
 Therefore, to treat this vast and problematic subject, I will present  a concrete example 
coming from my current research, namely the case of minority return in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(BH). This case involves a number of return-related problems that can be found elsewhere and 
put in a comparative perspective; it might also shed some light on the specific issue of 
minority return and the relationship between minority rights and (collective) identity. Indeed, 
in this case, return is supposed to take place to one's prewar home and not just to one's 
country, leaving candidates for return with the potential alternative between relocation with 
one's group or return as a minority.  
 
I shall begin my discussion by providing a brief overview of the main international 
legal texts on the right to return. I shall then discuss the interpretation of the divergence of 
position concerning return between humanitarian organizations and many refugees in terms of 
identity. After presenting the empirical situation of return in BH, as perceived through both 
personal observation2 and international or local reports, I will examine the relevance of 
speaking about return in terms of identity or individual rights. This is an oblique approach to 
                                                 
1 Will Kymlicka, Multinational Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995, chapter 4, section 2 (p. 88 of the French edition).  
2 These considerations about return are partly based on a four-month field study that I conducted in BH from 
April to July 2002. It involved direct observation and roughly 60 interviews, qualitative in method, about the 
personal reception of humanitarian aid (including aid for return) and the process of post-war justice. Interviews 
were conducted with (among others) refugees and returnees, victim, refugee and returnee associations and local 
employees of humanitarian organizations taking part in the return process. I also held some interviews with 
similar refugee and victim associations in Belgrade in June 2003.  
This study is part of an “ACI” research program concerning “International ethics and justice through the prism of 
the human sciences;” it was made possible through the generous support off the French Ministry of Research. 
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the question of minority rights, but: 1) on the one hand, referring back to Arendt's analysis in 
Imperialism,3 minorities and refugees are considered as two sides of the same coin, that of 
stateless individuals, who have no right to rights; 2) on the other hand, I will also specifically 
deal with the question of minority rights in terms of minority return, which is a more specific 
case than the general right to return of refugees to their home country.  
 
.  I. The main international legal texts on the right of return  
The main international texts on the right to return (which I quote in an appendix for 
clarification, without legal competence on the issue) set forth the general principles that states 
and international organizations are supposed to respect and apply, and determine any 
approach to this issue in terms of rights. They are in large part, but not exclusively, linked 
with the status of refugee.4  
First, the right to return appears as a part of the universal declaration of human rights 
(December 10, 1948) under the general provisions of freedom of movement and residence and 
a general right to leave one's country and to come back (article 13). This double aspect of the 
freedom of movement, external (freedom of movement between states) and internal (freedom 
of movement within one's country) is further stated in the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in which the right to return does not depend on a person's 
status as a refugee.5 
 Concerning the specific status of refugee, the basis for the right to return can be found 
in the Convention relating to the status of refugees (28 July 1951) and its 1967 Protocol. 
International refugee law affirms, indirectly, the right to return through the emphasis it places 
on voluntary repatriation as the preferred durable solution to refugee situations. There is a 
cessation of international protection and a voluntary repatriation of the refugee to his own 
country when he can once again avail himself of the protection of that country and “the 
                                                 
3 Hannah Arendt, Imperialism, New York: Harcourt, Brace  and World, 1951, chapter 5. 
4 For a clear overview and presentation of these texts, cf. the Human Rights Watch web site on the right to return 
(Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Watch Policy on the Right to Return.” http:// 
www.hrw.org/campaigns/israel/return/ic.) 
5 As is stressed in the Human Rights Watch Policy on the Right to Return, every individual who has maintained 
“genuine and effective links” with the territories in question should enjoy the right to return, regardless of 
whether he or she is a refugee, that is, someone who fled persecution. And the question of whether refugees left 
voluntarily or were expelled does not affect the right to return under this International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. This helps to distinguish the issue of the right of return from that of the conditions which led a 
person to leave the country or not; hence, for instance, this makes it possible to separate the issue of the right of 
return for Palestinians from the question of their condition of departure, whether it was a voluntary one or a 
forceful expulsion. Therefore, according to the French international lawyer Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, the 
conditions of departure are relevant only for the negotiations concerning reparations, not concerning the right to 
return in itself:  see “Le retour des Palestiniens et le droit international,” p. 299. 
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circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to 
exist.”6 Hence, a hosting country is not allowed to expel a refugee if his life or freedom would 
thereby be threatened (article 33 on prohibition of expulsion). 
International refugee law and international human rights law stress the right to return 
by insisting on freedom of movement and residence as well as on the prohibition of expulsion, 
which would make return a violation of refugees' rights.  
 
Except through the idea of freedom of residence, however, those texts do not specify 
the right to return home. For this right, we have to turn to the humanitarian law of the Geneva 
Conventions (4th convention, 1949). Article 49, on deportations, transfers and evacuations, 
prohibits individual or mass forcible transfers. In case of displacement, it stipulates: “Persons 
evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question 
have ceased [...]. The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian 
population into the territory it occupies.” This text affirms the right to return of protected 
populations, and safeguards the condition of return in forbidding the installation of another 
population on the same territory. 
  
II. The international policies for return and the point of view of returnees: discordant 
views 
  
In accordance with these texts, return has long been recognized as a durable solution 
for the situation of refugees, and it has become preponderant as an effective UNHCR policy 
in the 1990's.7 This return policy corresponds to the matching between the concern of the 
main donors, i.e. states, to get rid of refugees (European countries have been developing 
among the most restrictive immigration and asylum policies) and the view of the HCR, 
according to which freely accepted return and integration constitute the best solution. 
As soon as the reasons that led to the exile have disappeared, nothing legitimizes the 
refugees' staying in the hosting countries and spontaneous return is then justified. The ending 
                                                 
6 Article 1.C of the Refugee Convention stipulates that international protection for refugees ceases only under the 
following conditions: once a refugee has “re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality,” 
or “having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it,” or he has “voluntarily re-established himself in 
the country which he left or outside which he remained,” or “being a person who has no nationality he is, 
because of the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, 
able to return to the country of his former habitual residence.” 
7 In 1991, Sadako Ogata said that she was foreseeing the beginning of a decade of return which was officially 
announced in 1992; cf. Michael Barutciski, “Le droit international des réfugiés et le rapatriement involontaire,” 
Luc Cambrézy et Véronique Lasailly-Jacob, Populations réfugiées. De l'exil au retour, Paris: IRD, 2001, p. 323. 
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of refugee status means that international protection ceases when the refugee has “re-availed 
himself of the protection of the country of his nationality.”  
 With the ending of the persecution that caused the exile of the refugee in the first 
place, the return should be viewed as a return to normality, an undoing of the process that 
brought about the depriving of rights and, therefore, to a rehabilitation of rights, along with 
the restitution of the right to rights. This sense that return not only corresponds to the end of 
the cause of the exile but also to an undoing and a reversal of this process can be found in 
several statements of humanitarian organizations and NGOs, which, in public fund-raising 
campaigns, tend to represent return as the best solution corresponding to the deepest desires 
and hopes of refugees suffering from exile. It is particularly clear in the official declaration of 
the High Representative in BH, who claims that they invented a new human right, the right to 
return after a war,8 or in the different reports of the International Crisis Group, which present 
return as a victory over ethnic cleansing and nationalism. The return process appears at least 
as a partial undoing of injustice, or, in the best case, as an accomplishment of what is right. 
 Of course, there have been many successful returns, at least from the returnees' point 
of view, that seem to correspond to this view, as is the case of Albanians in Kosovo after the 
1999 war or Afghan people, whose speedy and spontaneous return has surpassed the 
expectations and accompanying capacities of the HCR. Nonetheless, the return processes as 
seen from the returnees' perspective is not always all that successful and often does not 
correspond to the criteria of free choice. 
1) First, there are situations where return has amounted to expulsion when the HCR, 
under pressure from states, sent refugees to places where they were in real danger.9 
This might simply be seen as a deplorable discrepancy between theory and practice, 
but there are further conditions leading to conflicting views between refugees and those 
promoting the “right to return.” 
2) The only obligation of states which have signed the refugee convention is a 
prohibition of expulsion, in a context of insecurity; the freedom of choice, though emphasized 
by the HCR as a principle, is not a legal obligation incumbent upon states and it is not even 
                                                 
8 Interview of Paddy Ashdown in the Guardian, October 11, 2002, quoted in the ICG Balkans report n° 137 “The 
continuing challenge of refugee return in Bosnia & Herzegovina,” p. 39.  
9 This was the case, for example, for Bedouins in Kuwait after the 1991 Iraq war according to Annick Bartoli, 
“De la théorie à la pratique. L'ambiguïté des politiques de rapatriement du HCR au Koweït et dans l'ex-Zaïre,” in 
Populations réfugiées. pp. 337-352. It is also the case of Albanian Kosovars expelled to Kosovo by various 
European countries  in 1998, contrary to the demands  of the HCR (cf. “Europe: reluctant hosts to Refugee 
reports,” U.S. Committee  for refugees, vol. 19, no. 9, September 1998). 
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explicitly stated in the 1951 convention on refugees.10 Voluntary and free return is a political 
and humanitarian preference, but not a legal requirement. The only obligation is the 
prohibition of expulsion leading to new exposure to danger and persecution. A simple ending 
of the persecution does not, therefore, entail freedom of choice for refugees when they face 
returning to places without a house, economic opportunity or a viable future. For instance, this 
is clearly the case of Bosnian refugees in Germany: benefiting from far better living 
conditions in the host country, the majority did not want to return to Bosnia after the war 
unless they were forced to do so.  
 Leaving aside any consideration of rights, the simplest utilitarian evaluation can help 
us to understand the possible discrepancy between the affirmation of the right to return and 
the preferences of refugees. The refusal or acceptance of return greatly depends on the 
difference of situation, well-being and opportunities (especially economic ones) between the 
conditions of exile and the conditions of return. Nonetheless, such a utilitarian perspective, 
though relatively easy to specify for a given individual or a given group, is far more difficult 
to establish from an impartial perspective, since, with the growing number of refugees and 
DPs, the number of candidates for asylum-seeking refugee status surpasses the capacities of 
even the most welcoming countries.  
3) There are cases where return, though freely accepted, does not meet refugee's hopes 
and expectations. When Thailand decided to close its refugee camps (1992-1993), Cambodian 
refugees were offered the choice between a sum of money and a plot of arable land along with 
material to construct a house. Most of them chose a piece of land close to their home and 
family, which was a way to go back to tradition and a rural mode of life. Subsequently, 
however, 90% of them accepted the money offer: land-plots were full of mines or in combat 
zones. The return was one that was neither to a previous life nor to normality.11 
 Such a discrepancy between the ideal dream of return and its actual refusal might even 
be the case among refugees stuck in refugees camps, whose situation seems particularly 
precarious and undesirable. In Luanda, Angola, refugees occupied the HCR building at the 
beginning of November 2002, to protest against their living conditions and oppose being 
returned to their country, asking instead for a right of resettlement in another country.12  
  
                                                 
10 As is explained by Michel Barutski in “Le droit international des réfugiés et le rapatriement involontaire” in 
Populations réfugiées,  pp. 323-336. 
11 Cf. Christel Thibault, “Terres spoliées, terres minées. Les obstacles au retour des réfugiés cambodgiens et les 
contraintes de la reconstruction nationale” in Populations réfugiées,  pp. 353-376. 
12 Cf. Michel Agier, “La main gauche de l'empire,” Multitudes, no 11 (winter 2003), p. 71. 
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 III. An interpretation in terms of identity 
The material conditions of return make it easy to understand such a refusal. There are 
cases of successful return, of course, in terms of institutional granting of rights and 
satisfaction of returnees. In many cases, however, return is not a panacea and does not amount 
to a return to before or to normalcy or a re-entitlement to the right to rights. Further, the 
longer the exile lasts, the more return means going back to an alien place. Indeed, when 
Hannah Arendt was writing her famous text on refugees, minorities and stateless peoples, she 
was already quite aware of the possible illusion of return: “More often than can be imagined, 
after the first world war, people hid behind their status of stateless person in order to stay 
where they were and avoid expulsion and return towards their ‘home’ country, where they 
would only have been foreigners.”13 
Beyond these empirical factors, the question is whether this issue can be put into 
conceptual terms? Is there any theoretical basis for this difference of point of view between 
international organizations and involuntary returnees? Such is the case, at least, according to 
the thought-provoking observations of Michel Agier, a French anthropologist, who has it that 
humanitarian organizations rely on a conception of identity linked to origin that is flawed. In 
fact, there is a vast amount of literature on refugees that presents this status as a loss of 
identity, both individual and collective, due to the loss of home, country, rights, previous 
employment, social status and social life, often after a process of dehumanization.  
According to Agier, the refugee's “naked” existence “is based on a loss of a place, to 
which were attached the characteristics of identity and memory, and on the absence of a new 
social place.”14 Such a status of place deprivation is also one of right deprivation. Talking 
about refugee camps in Africa where people stay as long as 10 or even 20 years, where they 
might be born and die, Agier notes that the only status accepted by the camp is that of the 
victim who is dependant upon humanitarian assistance and not allowed to work. In Kenya, for 
example, the refugee has no identity card, whether national or international.15 
As a consequence of this unidentified status, the place of origin becomes the point of 
reference defining identity and social place. Within this framework, the return of refugees to 
their home appears to be the only solution for their reintegration into the normal order of 
                                                 
13 L'Impérialisme, p. 254 of the French edition Paris, Fayard, Point Essais, 1982 (my translation); see also her 
comment that “the label ‘DP’ was forged during the war (2nd) to get rid once and for all of the phenomenon of 
statelessness by merely ignoring its existence. Not acknowledging the deprivation of a state amounts to 
expulsion towards the country of origin which either refuses to acknowledge the potential returnee as a citizen or 
wants to have him back at any cost to punish him”, p. 256 of the French edition (my translation). 
14 Michel Agier, Au bord du monde, les réfugiés, Paris: Flammarion, 2002, p. 55.  
15 Ibid. pp. 93-94. 
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things, both from the standpoint of humanitarian organizations16 and according to the 
European security policies which promote this as the humanist justification for national 
closure.17 
Despite the loss of previous identity, identity itself is not lost. Refugees tend to create 
new identities, distanced from their national one. “Among refugees confronting the obvious 
heterogeneity of their home society, ethnic relations become redefined, and, what is more, life 
in camps creates identity, both ethnic and non-ethnic. In the precarious material conditions 
and social instability [of camp life], it is an apprenticeship in... a distanced outlook on their 
own identity and the experience of a change that takes place...”18 In this refusal to go back 
home, as in the case of refugees in the Maheba camp, there are multiple reasons: age, family 
situation, the situation in the camp, the supposed situation back home, etc. Agier underlines 
that all this diversity of attitudes towards return corresponds to the conditions of identification 
in exile.19  
Thus, according to Agier, the situation created by wars and exodus leads to a 
questioning of the main pillars essential to nation-states: the first pillar connects birth with 
nationality (leaving in the dark the status of second-generation refugees, children born in a 
refugee camp), while the second establishes a relationship between citizenship and humanity, 
                                                 
16 It should be added, nonetheless that, even though the HCR is the expression of the will of states, which are the 
signatories of refugee conventions and the HCR's principal donors, the priority of return and native place is not 
as fundamental to the HCR's position as Agier claims. For instance, concerning the repatriation of Kosovars or 
Bosnians, the HCR pleaded several times for an extension of asylum rather than sending back refugees to places 
where they were in real danger. Nonetheless, its pleas have often been ignored. Besides, the HCR has included 
the “risk of return” in its criteria, if it is a potential destabilization for the peace process or for the returnees 
themselves (Cf. Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection, Geneva: United Nations High 
Commissioner for refugees, 1996). 
17 M. Agier, “La main Gauche de l'empire,” pp. 72-73. Cf. also “Les réfugiés du camp de Maheba (Zambie),” 
Autrepart, no 25 (March 2003): “D’une façon générale, dans les milieux politiques et humanitaires qui traitent 
des réfugiés, les lieux d’origine sont considérés comme la référence identitaire et la place sociale naturelle des 
populations déplacées sous la contrainte. Cette conception linéaire, non contradictoire, du lieu d’où l’on vient, 
d’où l’on a été chassé par la violence et où l’on veut revenir, ne peut que déboucher de manière dominante, 
univoque, sur l’expression d’un ‘droit au retour’ défendu comme revendication à la fois politique et vitale 
indiscutable, sur la ‘priorité au retour’ présentée comme seule solution à long terme par le HCR quand il s’agit 
de la réintégration des réfugiés, ou encore sur l’argument du bien-fondé humaniste du renvoi des populations 
réfugiées ‘chez elles’ dans les politiques sécuritaires actuelles en Europe.” 
18 M. Agier, Au bord du monde, les réfugiés, p. 154.  
19 According to M. Agier, “Les réfugiés du camp de Maheba (Zambie)”: “Pourtant, très souvent, les êtres en exil, 
au moment même où les organisations internationales, ou bien les Etats, prévoient leur retour, ont déjà fait 
l’expérience d’un nouvel emplacement dans les zones urbaines ou sur les sites humanitaires où ils se sont 
retrouvés d’abord confinés malgré eux, et où ils ont dû s’accommoder durant plusieurs années. Cette constatation 
est plus importante encore dans le cas de la “seconde génération” de réfugiés, la génération de ceux qui sont nés 
dans les camps ou qui y sont arrivés enfants [...]. Pour les réfugiés vivant à Maheba, on voit que la guerre et 
l’exil ont complexifié la conception des lieux, modifié les conditions de leur appropriation et entraîné des 
recompositions sociales autant que spatiales... C’est à partir de cette dynamique catégorielle, qui s’est construite 
au fil du temps dans ce camp, et des changements identitaires qui l’ont accompagnée, que se conçoivent les 
réponses à l’offre de retour”. 
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since any application of universal abstract human rights always depends on its application in a 
given place, such that people are only entitled to rights when they have access to national 
citizenship.20 By contrast, refugees could be emblematic of an emerging post-national order.21 
 
According to Agier's approach, the divergence in the evaluations of the rightness of 
return reflects two conceptions of identity: on the one hand, one rooted in origin (in native 
place and country) that corresponds to the identity of the original group (a nation) and is a 
given; on the other, an identity linked to change, both in space and time - a more individual 
identity rooted in events. That the latter conception of identity is more meaningful for 
refugees would explain their reluctance to return. As Agier rightly underlines, the former 
(national) conception of identity is not more fundamental than the other, since this national 
identity is no less a construct using origin as a founding myth. The “impossibility” of return 
for many refugees, where return would involve a recapturing of their original identity, also 
reveals the vacuity of such a model of identity.  
I would like to push this idea a little further by opposing an origin-based model of 
identity to a narrative conception of identity, as framed by the French philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur.22 A narrative conception of identity takes into account the historical aspect of the 
subject and the role of action, events and experience in the construction of identity. The 
identity is not a given but the narrative of one's life. Answering the question “who are you?” 
does not just involve saying where you are from, but telling a life story; narrative identity is 
neither stable nor without faults and is more fitting for the uprooted situation of a refugee. The 
relevance of this approach appears in the light of the procedures for the right of asylum and 
the status of refugee, which are based on a person telling his or her story of persecution and 
on his or her testimony.23 But the relative paucity of cases where this right is granted would 
only show the prevalence of the origin-based /national conception of identity. 
 
 IV. The limits of an approach in terms of identity 
This recourse to the idea of identity is attractive insomuch as it definitely sheds light 
upon the potential illusion of return when this is conceived as going back to one's origins, the 
                                                 
20 M. Agier, “La main gauche de l'empire”, p. 72. 
21 According to Arjun Appaduraï, Modernity  at large, Cultural dimension of Globalization, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996, quoted by Agier, “La Main gauche de l'empire”, p. 73.  
22 Among other texts, see Paul Ricœur, Temps et récit, 3. Le temps raconté, Paris: Seuil, 1985, p. 439 sq. or Soi-
même comme un autre, Paris: Seuil, 1990, sixth study.  
23 It is also the framework of many social science works or artistic representations concerning refugees or DPs, 
which are often based on life stories (‘récits de vie’).  
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possible disappointment of returnees who were hoping for such a return to “before” or their 
refusal to return when they have started a new life in exile. Nonetheless, I am diffident about 
the relevance of identity for evaluating return whether one deems return home to be 
appropriate for an origin-based identity or one considers relocation to another place or country 
to be more suited to a narrative and changing identity. The passing of time and the creation of 
a new identity are, or course, key factors, but they are not decisive. On the one hand, the 
return of Kosovars and Afghanis has been all the more massive for the fact that their exile was 
relatively short, but the massive return, in these cases, corresponds not only to the brevity of 
exile but also to a drastic change in the political situation. On the other hand, in Laos, for 
instance, most of the refugees who went back in 1989, after the closing of refugee camps in 
Thailand, returned after 15 years of exile and after having refused offers of resettlement in 
western countries or in China.24 In Bosnia, one of the largest minority returns has taken place 
in the area of Prijedor, nearly ten years after the people left their homes in 1992. Indeed, 
returnees have gone back there in much larger numbers than in Srebrenica, which Muslims 
massively left in 1995. According to a returnee from Kozarac, one reason (among others) for 
this difference is that, in Prijedor, people have had more time for mourning and healing.25  
It could be added that, while time definitely affects the individual choice of refugees 
and DPs, it does not necessarily open or close rights. For instance, according to the French 
professor of international law, Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, views on return, and the use 
they would make of this right if they were to obtain it, vary widely among individual 
Palestinians, but this issue has to be distinguished from the right of return as a community.26 
Besides, whatever the influence of time and identity on individual choice, the refugee's 
freedom of choice is not, in the actual system of international law, an obligation for the states 
who have signed the refugee conventions. One might hope for a more liberal state of the 
world with less drastic immigration policies and a new post-national order where individuals 
would be freer to change residence, and would not be identified by and tied to their origin, 
their village, their land. But, Arendt's analysis of the status of refugees, whether in exile or in 
repatriation, might still be valid: instead of revealing a post-national, cosmopolitan tendency 
with a prevalence of individual and human rights, it highlights the power of states and nations 
in the world order. 
                                                 
24 Cf. Fabrice Mignot, “Le rocher de la prospérité. La réinsertion des réfugiés au Laos,” in Populations réfugiées,  
pp. 377-401. 
25 Interview conducted on July 6, 2002 in Sanski Most with a forty-year-old widow, in the process of returning to 
Kozarac. 
26 M. Chemillier-Gendreau, “Le retour des Palestiniens et le droit international,” p. 300 sq. and p. 310. 
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Hence, what Agier suggests, namely ceasing to speak about identity only in terms of  
place of birth and origin, is not enough: in my view, identity itself should not be taken as a 
normative category, but rather -at best- a descriptive category likely to shed light on the 
choices and trajectories of refugees, as groups or as individuals. More precisely, even if this 
speaking in terms of identity is enlightening concerning the alternative between resettling 
abroad or going back to the country of origin, it is no longer helpful concerning the more 
precise issue of minority return (or more broadly the issue of whether one should go back 
home or resettle elsewhere in the country - which is not a side issue, given that the number of 
DPs has drastically grown in recent years, making the problem of internal DPs as crucial as 
that of refugees who crossed a border).  
Let us consider the following problem: according to his or her (original/ narrative) 
identity, where should/could a person go if his or her group has been largely displaced and 
return would be to a place where he or she would be minority? Let us suppose an origin-based 
conception of identity where the self is an encumbered one, that is, tied to preceding links, to 
a past, to a community,27 a conception likely to make sense of the longing for return. Where 
would that person go according to his or her identity: to the place where he or she comes from 
but where his or her community no longer lives and where his or her traditional activities 
might be over, as was the case for rural Cambodian refugees who could not farm mine fields? 
To the place where his or her previous community lives, which might be quite different from 
his or her home, as is the case for many rural refugees, in Cambodia or Bosnia, for example, 
who end up in the suburbs of big cities? When his or her community is scattered or dead, as 
might happen in the kind of mass killings that took place in Cambodia or Rwanda, going back 
to one's community might prove impossible or, if that community is defined in terms of 
sharing values and a conception of a common good, it might amount to settling far away from 
home, in a place where one's group constitutes a majority, with previously unknown people 
with whom one might have little else in common than nationality, implying a complete 
change of tradition (in many cases, from rural to urban).  
Conceiving of the return process in terms of identity does not solve the dilemma, since 
the conception of political life and community in terms of identity and encumbered selves 
applies first and foremost to stable, rooted communities, and not to uprooted communities and 
individuals whose ties have been cut. The situation of refugees or returnees breaks down what 
the vision of an encumbered self in a community merges: previous, involuntary attachments. 
                                                 
27 For such a conception of the self and of identity, see, for instance, M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
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Identity always comprises a plurality: it is being from this or that place, belonging to this or 
that family, being a part of such a group, having these or those professional or personal 
relations. Hence going back home might correspond to an origin-based identity tied to place 
and yet constitute a rupture with a “national” or community-based identity. Narrative identity 
is not much more enlightening. It helps us understand that people are no longer attached by 
their previous ties, but it does not allow us to say if they should change community, place, 
way of life or personal relations. Evoking identity, whether origin-based or narrative, provides 
only the illusion of a justification, since it leaves open several conflicting possibilities. 
Having underlined the limitation of an approach in terms of identity to embrace 
minority return, I would like to turn to an approach in terms of rights and conditions of 
justice, to see to what extent it might be more relevant. To discuss this issue, and to avoid the 
kind of hasty generalization involved in an identity-based approach, I will start with a brief, 
sketchy, and therefore very simplified presentation of a concrete case, that of return in BH.  
 
 V. The case of return in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 The case of BH is particularly interesting because the return process is supposed to 
take place not just to the country of origin but, more specifically, to pre-war homes. Since the 
first years after the war, the greatest part of return has been to majority areas. In more recent 
years, however, international agencies, the HCR and NGOs have focused on the return of 
minorities to their pre-war homes, that is, to a place where one is part of a minority group.28 A 
minority is taken, then, not only in the numerical sense of a group not constituting a majority 
(which would apply to Roms and Jews in all parts of BH), but also in the political sense of a 
non-ruling people, meaning not being part of the dominant group in terms of political, 
institutional, economic and territorial control (which would apply also, for instance, to Serbs 
in the Federation and to Muslims in RS, even in parts where they constituted a majority before 
the war and remain a majority on voting lists, as in Srebrenica). I leave aside the more 
complicated issue of the legal status of minorities in pre-war Yougoslavia and in present-day 
BH, where neither Serbs, nor Croats nor Muslims are minorities in the legal sense of the term 
but rather constituent peoples.  
 The legal framework for the return process is provided both by the international texts 
previously quoted and by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), Annex 7, which proclaims the 
                                                 
28 Given the internal division of the country into two official entities (the Federation and the Republika Srpska –
RS), if not in three unofficial ones (counting Croat controlled Herzegovina). 
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right of return for all refugees and DPs, in safety and without persecution or discrimination.29 
According to the general principle of freedom of choice, the “choice of destination shall be up 
to individual or family,” and properties are to be given back to their lawful owner or, if not, 
compensated. This entails a bundle of complicated issues. First, the right to private property: 
direct in the case of a private house, this right of property in a post-war process results from 
the privatization of socialized property on the basis of a pre-war right of occupancy. On top of 
the difficulties inherent to this privatization process - a process that is complicated, for 
example, in the case of religious properties which had been nationalized by the communist 
regime - there is the issue of actual access to lodging when the former homes of returnees are 
occupied by other DPs. Not only may a conflict arise with the current occupant, but also the 
possibility of legally regaining the apartment is contingent upon: 1) the legal framework (war-
time laws giving the rights of occupancy to refugees should be cancelled to give the priority 
to pre-war occupant/owners over war-time occupants), and 2) the effectiveness of the eviction 
of current occupants, generally belonging to the majority. Hence, the return process implies a 
vast displacement of populations backwards, sometimes years after they have settled in a new 
place in some kind of vast musical chairs game.  
 As on the international scene, the issue of return is very politicized and any ideal 
principle can hide not so well-meaning political interests. Hence the principle of freedom of 
choice, for instance, is promoted both by the partisans of return and by those supporting 
relocation which is very much in favor among parties that practiced and favored ethnic 
cleansing in the first place and want to maintain ethnic separation by defending the freedom 
of choice to live with one's group. In any case, freedom of choice seems to be a hollow 
principle when it amounts to no choice for finding a place of residence in the new place after 
expulsion from a war-time apartment.  
 Therefore, granted the opposition or reluctance of many ruling authorities to minority 
return, any material, administrative or political difficulties can be redoubled, at any stage of 
the process, to make it even more difficult. The main obstacles to return cited again and again 
by various sources, whether in direct interviews with refugees and returnees, in international 
reports30 or in local newspapers, are: 
                                                 
29 Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 7: “All refugees and DPs have the right freely to return to their homes of 
origin, they shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived...  and to be 
compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.”  
Office of the High Representative, “The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
Annex 7. (http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=375.) 
30 A large amount of information about return in BH and neighboring countries, mainly Serbia and Croatia, can 
be found in the reports of international organizations (available on their web sites) in charge of implementing 
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1) mines, bombs, threats, attacks on returnees or DPs visiting their homes or cemeteries, 
murder, the destruction of houses belonging to potential returnees, theft, the presence of war 
criminals in the local police, the dynamiting of religious edifices, difficulties for practicing 
one's religion, the hostility of the local population and DPs' fear of the other group (especially 
in cases of extreme violence between the communities during the war, as in Srebrenica), 
arrests for draft evasion or war crimes. 
2) a housing shortage (because of destruction or occupation by others), which can be 
aggravated by hostile relocation, meaning the bringing in of other DPs to prevent the return of 
original owners (as happened in Drvar), difficulties in reclaiming property (especially land 
and business premises), lack of resources, unemployment. 
3) discrimination and legal obstacles, intimidation by local authorities, administrative delays, 
discrimination in access to social services reserved for the majority, to public services and to 
facilities like water and telephone, being treated as a second-class citizen (which has led many 
refugees to return to BH from a third country), job discrimination (in the context of high 
unemployment, the public sector remains the main employer), objectionable school curricula 
(especially concerning recent history), intimidation by their own authorities when these favor 
relocation with one's group. 
 Given such obstacles, factors favoring return are the possibility of visiting previous 
homes and cemeteries and traveling inside the country, the absence of violence against 
returnees, guarantees of safety, the absence of violence between communities during the war 
(as in Drvar), the arrest of war criminals (especially when they belong to the police, as in 
Prijedor), efficacy on the part of Sfor and international police (IPTF) in protecting returnees 
and the reform of local police, the availability of housing and the successful reclaiming of 
property, the availability of humanitarian aid for reconstructing property (often in the form of 
self-help, which involves the house being constructed by the family concerned using provided 
materials).  
Due to the high level of obstruction and discrimination, however, even successful 
return -in terms of number and duration-, depends on the returning group's ability to organize 
itself, as happened in Prijedor and Drvar. Sustainable return is most often that of a group, 
                                                 
this return, such as the UNHCR, and OHR (Office of the High Representative in BH), which chairs the RRTF 
(the Reconstruction and Return Task Force) coordinating the support and actions of many agencies (UNHCR, 
the World Bank, the European Commission, etc.), or the OSCE. Cf. also the several reports of the ICG 
(International Crisis Group) or those by human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty 
International. There are too many such reports to quote them all. 
Concerning the point of view of refugees' and returnee's associations belonging to the coordination 
“Living Together,” see Return, a magazine for refugees and displaced persons promoting return, published by 
the Media Center “Prelom” in Banja-Luka. 
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rather than of individuals; return is often achieved thanks to grassroots returnees 
organizations, which are able to face obstructions and bring in returnees in large enough 
numbers to obtain representatives in local municipalities or even elect the mayor, as in Drvar. 
Return takes place more easily in areas where returnees belonged to a majority before the war 
or presently constitute a majority, either through settling in remote villages or by the creation 
of parallel institutions (like schools) and a separate economy. It also depends on the structure 
of the family, according to the number of working people in the family or its capacity to split 
apart in order to allow one part (old and retired people) to go back home while others stay in 
the majority area (but this might aggravate the housing shortage). Return is rarely 
reintegration and leads to a divided life, whether the division lived be at the level of the 
community or of the individual, as when a person resides in one entity while getting social 
benefits or working or sending kids to school in the other. 
 
 VI. The interpretation of the right to return as a bundle of rights 
In the face of such gross discrimination against minorities and minority return, one 
might wonder if we need anything like sophisticated philosophical tools or specific theories of 
minority rights. These cases of discrimination are so obvious that a simple liberal principle of 
equality would suffice to guarantee minority return for those willing to go through the 
process. It would also benefit non-minorities, both returnees and non-returnees, whose access 
to jobs and apartments is adversely affected by nepotism and clientelism within the ruling 
parties. The main difficulties encountered previously amount to the violation of basic rights 
and liberties such as 1) security and freedom of movement (and freedom of conscience and 
religion), 2) property and 3) equality and non-discrimination in access to social services, 
schools and employment. Simply guaranteeing these fundamental rights would go a long way 
towards meeting the returnees' basic demands.31 A basic theory of civil rights would help 
make sense of the point of view of refugees, who tend to deem return to be a desirable thing 
or yet another injustice according to whether the corresponding rights are honored or violated; 
for, often times, a loss of security and civil rights are the trade off for the right to live in one's 
home.  
Hence, it could be argued that the issue of the rightness of return boils down to an 
issue of rights and conditions of justice, which may be present only in part or even altogether 
absent, the combination of all these rights being the condition for successful and fair return. 
                                                 
31 More specific issues, like disagreements concerning curricula and the teaching of history, are in great part not 
specific to minority issues but to relations between previously warring parties. 
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Therefore, on the one hand, there is not a right to return by itself that can disconnected from 
the conjunction of more basic rights, like the right to security, property, civil rights and 
political representation. Return without these rights might be a fact, not a right. From this 
perspective, aiding returnees to build houses, as many humanitarian organizations do, helps 
only to support the access to property and the right to property, but not to promote the right of 
return if other rights like that of security are not guaranteed (as when returnees are killed in 
their regained houses). On the other hand, denying the right to return to someone or to a group 
is not just a side issue, but also the denial of the more basic rights of which it consists. 
Once the importance of rights has been underlined, to what extent can the issue of 
return be reduced to a question of rights? There might be return without rights, yet there might 
also be rights and a right of return without return: guarantying rights might lead to return, but 
it might just as well not, given that many returnees who have recovered their home either 
leave it vacant, rent it to refugees occupying it or sell it (but this phenomenon is hard to 
assess, since it is an object of rumors and personal arrangements more than statistics). The 
right of return can be broken down analytically into a series of rights (property, freedom of 
movement, etc.) that one might choose to benefit from elsewhere. In that case, return is a 
derivative, not a primary right rooted in identity. What, then, is left of this right? Is there 
anything specific in it once no longer conceived in terms of identity tying people to a place 
and previous attachments?  
Paradoxically, it could be argued, contrary to communitarian views, that a form of 
individualism and libertarianism could make sense of this right of return. Since rights are 
attached to individuals,32 it is the right of property, and not identity or place, that attaches me 
to my home and confers importance on a right of return. Likewise, seeing a violation of basic 
individual rights as a deep attack on the self would make sense of a person's wish not to 
return. A theory of the disencumbered self does not fail more than a theory of the encumbered 
self to explain the attachments to one's belongings. On the contrary, such a theory can make 
sense of the rightness of return even when it does not succeed to restore previous links and 
attachments. At first sight, it is not clear that a libertarian theory can take into account this 
desire and right of return, when a certain view of the detached self might also lead to a praise 
of free movement. But, given that return does not amount to a simple re-establishing of 
previous attachments, the disencumbered self attached to his rights might be a better image of 
the successful returnee than someone in search of a lost identity.  
                                                 
32 See for instance, Nozick's views in Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974. 
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Besides, Nozick's criterion of the correction of injustice would allow us to understand 
the importance of the right to return without return: if, when rights are minimally guaranteed, 
everyone chooses to sell his or her house and settle elsewhere, then it does not amount to the 
same thing as no right to return and mere compensation. The right to sell one's property 
creates a form of justice in transfer and acquisition that breaks the cycle of violation to initiate 
an order of legitimacy. Even if, in the end, the social order amounts to the one created by 
violence, it is not entirely founded on violence33. 
There is something provocative in this recourse to a right/individualist theory, of 
course, since return as a political process and the right of return are also a matter of groups 
and institutions and since they show the vacuity of formal rights: the right to possess one's 
house without the house, the right to move freely without a means of transportation, an 
official equality of rights without the power to exercise those rights, which exist only on 
paper. The material and economic difficulties encountered  by returnees would underline the 
vacuity of formal rights without material or institutional support. As a DP from Srebrenica, 
reluctant to return home, bluntly put it: “it's nice to rebuild our house, but we already saw that 
during the war: you cannot eat the walls”. Speaking only in terms of rights certainly captures 
the discrimination part of the picture, but, even if basic rights were respected, it is still not a 
good image of fair return. 
Let us suppose that, in a given area where all houses were destroyed, each person 
(belonging to the majority or the minority) is granted the same amount of material for 
reconstructing his or her home according to the practice of self-help. Obviously if you have 
lost a leg during the war, you will be unable to do it yourself. Likewise, if you are a widow or 
someone whose family is dead or absent, the distance between the right to a home and the 
accomplishment of that right will depend on the solidarity of the community and the real 
presence of family and social relations, which cannot be framed in terms of rights. 
Hence, I would like to suggest, as a hypothesis that should be further worked out, that 
the rightness of return could be conceived in the light of Amartya Sen's theory of capabilities, 
which underlines the limitation of a theory of rights, while keeping an individual perspective. 
Such a perspective, which cannot provide the whole picture, of course, is nonetheless 
essential to avoid treating refugees and returnees as simple pawns in a political game. 
                                                 
33 This seems to be in agreement with the clauses on restitution of property in the DPA, Annex 7, article 12, 
section 2 “any person requesting the return of property who is found by the Commissions to be the lawful owner 
of that property shall be awarded its return.”  
Article 12, section 3 states: “in determining the lawful owner of any property, the Commission shall not 
recognize valid any illegal property transaction, including any transfer that was made under duress, exchange for 
exit permission or documents, or that was other wise in connection with ethnic cleansing.” 
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Capabilities are what allow us to bridge the gap between resources and accomplishment, 
between the theoretical possession of rights and the actual exercising of those rights. Certainly 
being a part of a minority in a the midst of a possibly hostile or unwelcoming majority is a 
matter of rights, but it is not only that. The level of powerlessness should also be viewed 
through the lack of the capabilities constituted by family, professional and social relations, 
which make it possible to bridge the gap between rights and their actual exercising. On this 
view, the importance of inter-subjective attachments with neighbors, one's group or one's 
community in the return process is more fully accounted for than in an approach in terms of 
rights, without being cast in terms of identity: the necessity to conceive capabilities in terms 
of social relations with members of the same group is also revealing of less apparent forms of 
discrimination than simple denial of rights.  
 
Addendum: 
In lieu of a conclusion to this paper, I would like to clarify a few of the problems and 
objections raised in the framework of the conference “Collective identity, sovereignty and 
minority rights.”34 I have defended an individual approach to the question of the right of 
return, and, more specifically, minority return, and I argued that there is no specific right to 
return apart from a bundle of more basic rights, without the coordination of which return is a 
fact and not a right. I also argued that the evaluation of this right has little to do with a 
question of identity, whether collective or individual, and that narrative identity is hardly 
more relevant than origin-based identity. Promoting or opposing return, relocation or exile in 
terms of identity often thinly masks dysfunctional institutions and the violation of rights. This 
does not mean that there is no relevance in the various issues often evoked under the category 
of identity, such as previous attachments, relations with one's group or the passing of time, but 
their relevance for the evaluation of the rightness of return might be better accounted for in 
terms of capabilities as conditions for the exercising of individual rights. 
Hence, my perspective is neither legal and strictly normative nor merely descriptive of 
the refugees' views. It would be preposterous to pretend that rights or identity describe the 
actual choices or systems of evaluation of refugees and returnees, whose motives and 
decisions often remain multifaceted and opaque. What I have tried to provide is a conceptual 
reconstruction of what justice and fairness in return would (and would not) be. While trying to 
                                                 
34 I would like to thank the participants of the conference for helpful objections and remarks as well as Tobias 
Vogel for the discussion that followed it. 
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make explicit the specific cases which nourished my thinking in order to avoid hasty 
generalization.  
How, though, can the fairness of return be evaluated in individual rather than 
collective terms? Pleading for an individual approach to the right to return does not mean that 
return is not a collective right detained by a group or a people. Though most international 
texts on the right of return refer to individual rights, the question of whether or not the Geneva 
Conventions protecting the right of populations to return home defend a collective right is a 
controversial one.35 Leaving aside this issue, to what extent can a collective and an individual 
approach be separated? From a theoretical and legal perspective, it can be claimed that these 
two approaches can be dealt with separately: on the one hand, as Monique Chemillier-
Gendreau argues, a collective right can exist whether or not individuals decide to use it; on the 
other hand, return as a right is guaranteed by individual rights, even in the absence of a 
collective right to return. In the realizing of a right to return, however, an individual approach 
cannot be separated from a collective one.  
First, the individual's right to return cannot be separated from the possibility, if not the 
right, to return as a group, since successful return is most often that of a group rather than 
individuals (a factor which the idea of the capabilities takes into account). Conversely, the 
right to return as a group is empty and vain if it does not correspond to individual rights to do 
so. The realizing of a collective right to return is not separable from the individual rights that 
make return a right. In the absence of security, freedom of movement or freedom of 
conscience, return is for each individual not a right but a fact, whether another group or his or 
her own group deprives him or her of such rights.  
Furthermore, though I began by saying that return is a very thorny issue because very 
politicized, this is no longer so clearly the case when we come down to the individual level: 
not only does the mosaic of individual attitudes towards return fall on all sides of ethnic or 
community lines, but it also does not follow stark political divisions like that between 
nationalists opposing minority return and liberals promoting it in the name of 
multiculturalism. Such a mosaic can lead to unpredictable results, as a recent and very 
controversial poll among Palestinian refugees suggests:  refugees' views on return fit neither 
with the insistence of Palestinian authorities on the priority of the right of return nor with the 
                                                 
35 According to Monique  Chemillier-Gendreau this right is not only individual (as in the declaration on human 
rights) but also collective. She holds that while the term “population” is used in the Geneva Convention, and not 
the term “people”, what is meant, in the context of 1949, is the safeguard of the group as such with its national 
rights and on its territory, from which it can be expelled only on the condition of being returned. Furthermore, 
the possibility of a right to return as a group can be derived from the 1960 texts on decolonization and the right 
of peoples (op. cit. p. 300 sq.). 
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Israelis' refusal to grant such a right for fear that Palestinian refugees would arrive en masse.36 
From an individual perspective, the right of return, even collectively granted, might be a 
matter of a relatively wide spectrum of various possible degrees, ranging from no return at all 
to full return and everything in between. In which case, return is more easily dealt with in 
political terms. In accordance not only with the plurality of individual choices, but also with 
the conception of the right of return as a bundle of rights, return is not a collective block or an 
absolute. Therefore, even though it cannot be separated from the actualization of a plurality of 
rights, it can be realized in a plurality of ways, leading, for instance, to the return of the dead, 
return as a landlord, etc. Various degrees of return do not allow a fragmentation of rights 
since burying the dead at home, for instance, also requires security, freedom of movement or 
freedom of conscience in religious funeral rites. 
 Finally, an individual approach to the right of return should lead us to distinguish two 
levels: that at which problems can be solved and that at which solutions and their fairness are 
to be evaluated. A recent academic publication sponsored by the UNHCR, Imagine 
Coexistence, sheds light on the ambiguities and flaws of return and reconciliation policies 
based on an individual and inter-subjective approach. Attempts at restoring dialogue among 
individuals from divided communities through micro-projects are generally successful at an 
individual level, where professional and personal relations succeed in overcoming prejudices, 
whether in Bosnia, Kosovo or Rwanda. But, those micro-level initiatives do not extend 
beyond the individual level, contrary to the expectations of their promoters, who were hoping 
to be able to use those micro-projects as a lever to effect political change towards 
multiculturalism and democracy through the development of a civil society. The changes in 
prejudices and attitudes towards the other group remain limited to the individuals encountered 
(in the form of “he's great, but he is not like the other ones”), or to a micro-level (for instance, 
when a multicultural change at a municipal level is blocked at the cantonal level).  
                                                 
36 This poll was conducted by Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 
and included 4500 refugee families living in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan and Lebanon. Only 10% said 
they would pursue permanent residence in Israel and more than half said that they would accept compensation. 
According to the New York Times of July 14, 2003, “Dr. Shikaki said the poll's result showed that refugees were 
less interested in being nationalist standard-bearers than in living fuller lives. ‘Refugees are human beings with 
needs’ he said. ‘These people want to live their lives.’” On the mob attack against Shikaki in Ramallah, see the 
article of the New York times, July 14, 2003, “Palestinian Mob Attacks Pollster Over Study on 'Right of return'” 
by James Bennet.  
 This study has been criticized for being biased and for giving up the right to return (cf. for instance, the 
comments of Ali Abunimah in the article “Who said that Palestinians have given up their rights?” published in 
the Daily Star, July 23, 2003), but it could also be argued that this study provides strong grounds for granting the 
right of return as a matter of principle, since doing so would not pose a threat to Israelis' demographic and 
political balance. (All my thanks to T. Vogel for bringing those articles to my attention). 
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I can only concur with two of the diagnoses proposed in this study for such a gap 
between expectations and results. First, the hope of wider political changes through micro-
level initiatives relied on an overly simplistic conception of identity and otherness as key 
factors for the preceding conflicts, such that it was expected that an actual encounter with the 
“other” would break walls of prejudice. Second, they also relied on an overly subjective and 
psychological conception of reconciliation as an inter-subjective process between individuals, 
underestimating the institutional dimension of the process.37 Therefore, I would argue that an 
individual perspective is necessary for evaluating the fairness of return in order to avoid using 
individuals as displaceable pawns, whether to promote nationalism or multiculturalism. This 
does not entail, however, that the problems encountered in the return issue can be dealt with at 
the individual level nor that individuals can bear the whole burden of coping with or 
reforming unfair and dysfunctional institutional systems. 
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Appendix 
Main international legal texts on the right to return 
 
Universal declaration of human rights (December 10, 1948): According to Article 13  
 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
state  
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country. 
 
 
 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (article 12) 
 
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right 
to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are 
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or 
morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights 
recognized in the present Covenant 
 4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. 
 
Concerning the specific status of refugee, the basis for the right to return under 
international refugee law can be found in the Convention relating to the status of refugees 
(July 28, 1951) and its 1967 Protocol (in reference with the UN Charter and the Universal 
declaration of human rights).  
 
Article 1.C of the Refugee Convention stipulates that international protection for refugees 
ceases only under the following conditions:  
once a refugee has “re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality”... or 
he has “voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he 
remained”, or “being a person who has no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in 
connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return 
to the country of his former habitual residence”. 
 
Article 33. - Prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”) 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever 
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion 
 
 
Concerning the specific right to return home, cf. the humanitarian law of the Geneva 
Conventions (4th convention of August 12, 1949.) 
Art. 49 - Deportations, transfers, evacuations 
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Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from 
occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, 
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. 
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a 
given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such 
evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the 
occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such 
displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as 
hostilities in the area in question have ceased. 
The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the 
greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected 
persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and 
nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated. 
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as 
they have taken place. 
The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly 
exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military 
reasons so demand. 
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population 
into the territory it occupies  
 
 
 
The right to return to one's home might be stated specifically in regional texts or 
resolution on specific countries or political situations like in the Dayton Peace Agreement of 
1995 for BH or by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of December 
11, 1948 concerning the status of Palestinians refugees38. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be 
permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those 
choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in 
equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible; 
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social 
rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director 
of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies 
of the United Nations. 
  
